WHOIS ACCURACY
and
PUBLIC SAFETY

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OBJECTIVES

• Update: Public Safety Uses of WHOIS
• Current WHOIS accuracy challenges
• Example
• Suggestions for policy proposal?
ACCESS

• Access to the RIPE Database is available to anyone provided the Terms and Conditions are followed (art. 2 RIPE Database Terms and Conditions).
USES

Security and reliability of the network:

• Ensuring the uniqueness of Internet number resource usage
• Facilitating coordination between network operators (network problem resolution, outage notification etc.)

Accountability:

• Providing information about the Registrant and Maintainer of Internet number resources when the resources are suspected of being used for unlawful activities, to parties who are authorised under the law to receive such information (art. 3 RIPE Database Terms and Conditions)

• In practice: Assisting, public safety organisations, businesses, consumer groups, individuals in combating abuse and fraud and seeking redress.
PUBLIC SAFETY USE OF WHOIS

• WHOIS lookups are one of the tools investigators use in addition to:
  ▪ Routing tables/services
  ▪ Commercially available tools

• However, WHOIS is the most common starting point for most investigations
PROBLEM

IP Address Chain of Custody Inaccuracy Issue:

- Sub-allocations are not properly documented -> leads to outdated data

- Each RIR tends to have different policies and requirements for what information to retain regarding sub-allocations
Internet Users
Receive and use assigned IP addresses

ICANN
Allocates blocks of IP addresses to five regional Internet registries worldwide

RIRs
Allocates blocks of IP addresses to entities within their respective regions

RIRs members - ISPs & LIRs
Assign IP address to end users & sub-allocate to smaller ISPs

ISPs and LIRs NOT RIRs

NO requirement to keep accurate registration data
• Section 4 of the IPv4 Address Allocation and Assignment Policies:
  ✓ Registration data (range, contact information, status etc.) must be correct at all time (i.e. they have to be maintained)

• Art 6.1 of the RIPE NCC Standard Service Agreement
  ✓ Members acknowledge and adhere to RIPE Policy

• Art 6.3 Standard Service Agreement: In case of non-compliance
  ✓ Suspension
  ✓ Deregister
SUB-ALLOCATION

• Section 5.4 - IPv4 Address Allocation and Assignment Policies:
  ✓ LIR is contractually responsible for ensuring the address space allocated to it is used in accordance with RIPE community’s policies.
  ✓ It is recommended that LIRs have contracts requiring downstream network operators to follow the RIPE community's policies when those operators have sub-allocations.

• COMPLIANCE?
CHALLENGES

- Inability to serve legal process to the party responsible for the resources

- Inability to quickly identify resources used in abusive activities

- Waste of time of investigators and network operators:
  - Investigators go from ISP to ISP to serve legal order
  - Network operators need to answer request for information not relevant

- IP hijacking resulting in those resources used for criminal activities
WHAT WE WOULD NEED

- WHO and WHERE (ISP) to serve a legal order on?
- REAL ADDRESS of the last downstream provider in allocation of a suspected IP address = ISP closest to the subject

WHAT WE DON’T WANT

- We're not looking for end-user data, we can't get it without a warrant.
CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND:
- Supermarket chain - IT systems compromised - 7.8 million customer details
- Network intrusion - SQL injection attack
- Log files - IP address 95.168.XXX.XX

GOAL:
- Serve legal process on the ISP to attribute the attack to a named subscriber
- Conduct open source research to identify the address of the Hosting Provider
Information on the provider in the RIPE database:

- 3 different addresses in the UK
- 1 address in Serbia
- 1 address in Belize
- 1 US phone number
- 1 Swedish phone number
- 1 UK phone number
POLICY PROPOSAL
Policy principles

• Require **registration of all IP sub-allocations to downstream ISPs** so entire chain of sub-allocations are accurately reflected in WHOIS

• **NOT disclose end-user information** but instead focus on downstream ISP providing connectivity to the end-user

• **Benefits to the entire community**
  - Provides both public and private sector communities with effective incident response

• **Ways to ensure adherence to policy requirements**
  - Incentives?
  - Compliance?
WAY FORWARD

- Coordinated Effort with RIRs and Public Safety Organizations
  - ARIN: DEA, RCMP and FBI - done Oct 2016
  - RIPE NCC: Europol - NOW

- Introduce individual Policy Proposals in Spring 2017
  - Not global policy via NRO
  - Draft with the help of all 5 RIR communities
  - Submit at RIR meetings in Spring 2017

- Seeking industry assistance
  - Collaborate with RIPE/RIR communities for industry-led solution
  - Task force? Brainstorming?
Thank you

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