Illegitimate Source IP Addresses At Internet Exchange Points

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Franziska Lichtblau, Florian Streibelt, Philipp Richter, Anja Feldmann 26.10.2016

TU Berlin

Introduction

Packets with source addresses that are not valid within the scope of the public Internet.

What are illegitimate source IP addresses?

- Intentionally spoofed traffic
- Internal traffic leaked by mistake
- General misconfiguration, unknown...

Packets with source addresses that are not valid within the scope of the public Internet.

- Includes attack traffic (DoS, DDoS, ...)
- Studying unwanted traffic can give insights to come up with mitigation strategies
- Potentially exposes information about internal infrastructure
- Utilizes (expensive) bandwidth

- BOGON: RFC1918, IANA reserved, Multicast, Future Use, etc...
- UNROUTED: Source IP address is not announced in the "global routing table"
- INVALID: Traffic sent by a network that is not responsible for the corresponding prefix

- Previous studies like the Spoofer Project send probes to check for BCP38 compliance
- Our work is a passive approach to check for BCP38 deployment
- Provides insights about specific traffic volume and characteristics

Identifying Traffic

Identifying Bogon and Unrouted

Bogon

• RFC1918, Multicast, Future Use, IANA reserved

Traffic with a source address which is covered by this list is of class BOGON

Unrouted

- Routing information: IXP Route Server, RIPE/RIS, RouteViews
- Compile a list of observed prefixes at all routing sources

Ignored: Announcements larger than /8 and smaller than /24

Traffic with a source address which is **not** covered by this list is of class UNROUTED

We utilize as many data sources as possible to minimize false positives

- RIPE/RIS (14 collectors)
- RouteViews (16 collectors)
- Bogon/Martian prefix list as provided by Team Cymru

Bogon Prefixes

- As defined in RFC1918 and RFC5737
- 2.3M /24
- 14% of the IPv4 address space

Unrouted Prefixes

- 11.3M validly announce /24 (78% of the IPv4 address space)
- 3.16M unrouted /24 (excluding Bogon)







Assumption: An AS announcing a prefix is also a legitimate source for traffic originating from this prefix.





Construct list of valid prefixes for each AS







Prefix lists are also created for AS B, AS C and AS D (derived from public routing data) and added to the list of AS A



INVALID: Traffic with a SRC IP from a Prefix NOT covered by the prefix list of AS A

Identifying Invalid: Limitations

False positives

- No full picture of the complete BGP state
- Can not capture direct private interconnects

False negatives

 AS must just be somewhere on the AS Path to be valid source

Lots of number crunching involved

The process works completely offline, using a lot of computation time and memory.

Applying our methodology at a Large European IXP

- Measurements taken at a Large European IXP (LIXP)
- $\cdot\,$ More than 700 members and peak traffic up to 5 Tb/s
- 5 weeks of uninterrupted IPFIX from 2016-01-18 to 2016-02-21
- Sampling rate 1/32K
- We only considered IPv4 (until now...no need to queue for this question ;))

Fractions of BOGON, UNROUTED, INVALID in terms of total traffic

	Absolute traffic	Bytes	Packets
Bogon	28.11 TB	0.004%	0.029%
Unrouted	72.56 TB	0.010%	0.053%
Invalid	509.68 TB	0.076%	0.087%

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Relative amount is small, but absolutely we have 610TB of traffic for all 3 classes within one week.

Overview: Traffic Classes Over One Week





Figure 1: LIXP: TCP - Time series week 2016-01-18

Figure 2: LIXP: UDP - Time series week 2016-01-18

Top 20 UDP Destination Ports



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Contribution to INVALID by IXP member



80% of the INVALID traffic can be attributed to 3 IXP members

Member Categorization (Bogon)



Per Member Traffic Volume: TCP SRC | PKTS (SAMPLED)

Figure 3: LIXP BOGON

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Per Member Traffic Volume: TCP SRC | PKTS (SAMPLED)

Figure 3: LIXP BOGON

- Majority does not leak anything
- TCP SYNs leaked: Probably misconfigured NAT
- Mostly low traffic ISPs and small hosters

Member Categorization (Unrouted and Invalid)



Per Member Traffic Volume: TCP SRC | PKTS (SAMPLED)



Member Categorization (Unrouted and Invalid)



Per Member Traffic Volume: TCP SRC | PKTS (SAMPLED)

Figure 4: LIXP: UNROUTED and INVALID

- More members involved than in BOGON
- Still lots of members with 0%
- High traffic members have low unwanted level
- Lots of low traffic ISPs and hosters

Conclusion

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- Large networks tend to deploy their filtering correctly (Yes, it can be done!)
- Many small networks lack proper filtering
- Only a small amount of members contribute most of the unwanted traffic

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Continue the ongoing efforts by the community to educate people and get rid of excuses!