



WHOIS ACCURACY and PUBLIC SAFETY

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# **OBJECTIVES**

- Update: Public Safety Uses of WHOIS
- Current WHOIS accuracy challenges
- Example
- Suggestions for policy proposal?







 Access to the RIPE Database is available to <u>anyone</u> provided the Terms and Conditions are followed (art. 2 RIPE Database Terms and Conditions).







#### Security and reliability of the network:

- Ensuring the uniqueness of Internet number resource usage
- Facilitating coordination between network operators (network problem resolution, outage notification etc.)

#### Accountability :

- Providing information about the Registrant and Maintainer of Internet number resources when the resources are <u>suspected of being used for</u> <u>unlawful activities</u>, to parties who are authorised under the law to receive such information (art. 3 RIPE Database Terms and Conditions)
- <u>In practice</u>: Assisting, public safety organisations, businesses, consumer groups, individuals in <u>combating abuse and fraud and seeking redress</u>.





# PUBLIC SAFETY USE OF WHOIS

- WHOIS lookups are <u>one of the tools</u> investigators use in addition to:
  - Routing tables/services
  - Commercially available tools
- However, WHOIS is the most common <u>starting</u> <u>point</u> for most investigations





# PROBLEM

## IP Address Chain of Custody Inaccuracy Issue:


Sub-allocations are not properly documented -> leads to outdated data

 Each RIR tends to have different policies and requirements for what information to retain regarding sub-allocations





### IP Address Chain of Custody Inaccuracy Issue







#### **RIPE NCC POLICY FRAMEWORK**

- Section 4 of the IPv4 Address Allocation and Assignment Policies:
  - ✓ Registration data (range, contact information, status etc.) must be correct at all time (i.e. they have to be maintained)
- Art 6.1 of the RIPE NCC Standard Service Agreement
  ✓ Members acknowledge and adhere to RIPE Policy
- Art 6.3 Standard Service Agreement: In case of noncompliance
  - ✓ Suspension
  - ✓ Deregister





#### **SUB-ALLOCATION**

- Section 5.4 IPv4 Address Allocation and Assignment Policies:
  - ✓ LIR is contractually responsible for ensuring the address space allocated to it is used in accordance with RIPE community's policies.
  - ✓ It is recommended that LIRs have contracts requiring downstream network operators to follow the RIPE community's policies when those operators have suballocations.
- COMPLIANCE?





## **CHALLENGES**

- Inability to serve legal process to the party responsible for the resources
- Inability to quickly identify resources used in abusive activities
- Waste of time of investigators and network operators:
  - Investigators go from ISP to ISP to serve legal order
  - Network operators need to answer request for information not relevant
- <u>IP hijacking</u> resulting in those resources used for criminal activities





## WHAT WE WOULD NEED

- WHO and WHERE (ISP) to serve a legal order on?
- REAL ADDRESS of the last downstream provider in allocation of a suspected IP address = ISP closest to the subject

## WHAT WE DON'T WANT

 We're not looking for end-user data, we can't get it without a warrant.



# CASE STUDY

#### **BACKGROUND:**

- Supermarket chain IT systems compromised 7.8 million customer details
- Network intrusion SQL injection attack
- Log files IP address 95.168.XXX.XX



#### GOAL:

- Serve legal process on the ISP to attribute the attack to a named subscriber
- Conduct open source research to identify the address of the Hosting Provider





# Information on the provider in the RIPE database:

- 3 different addresses in the UK
- 1 address in Serbia
- 1 address in Belize
- 1 US phone number
- 1 Swedish phone number
- 1 UK phone number







# POLICY PROPOSAL





# **Policy principles**

- Require <u>registration of all IP sub-allocations to downstream</u> <u>ISPs</u> so entire chain of sub-allocations are accurately reflected in WHOIS
- <u>NOT disclose end-user information</u> but instead focus on downstream ISP providing connectivity to the end-user
- <u>Benefits to the entire community</u>
  - Provides both public and private sector communities with effective incident response
- Ways to ensure adherence to policy requirements
  - Incentives?
  - Compliance?





# WAY FORWARD

#### Coordinated Effort with RIRs and Public Safety Organizations

- LACNIC: Costa Rican Police and DEA done Sept. 2016
- APNIC: Sri Lanka Police done Oct. 2016
- ARIN: DEA, RCMP and FBI done Oct 2016
- RIPE NCC: Europol NOW
- AfriNIC: Mauritius Police and African Union to be done Dec. 2016
- Introduce individual Policy Proposals in Spring 2017
  - Not global policy via NRO
  - Draft with the help of all 5 RIR communities
  - Submit at RIR meetings in Spring 2017
- Seeking industry assistance
  - Collaborate with RIPE/RIR communities for industry-led solution
  - Task force? Brainstorming?





## Thank you

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